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The General Revision of the Copyright




The copyright law of the United States' was given its last
general revison in 1909.2 That law, with minor amendment re-
mained the United States Law of Copyright until the recent
enactment of the General Revision of Copyright Law, which Act
was signed into law by President Gerald R. Ford on October 19,
1976. 3 The old law was considered a bare bones act, short on
© Copyright 1977 Andrew E. Katz
* B.S., U.C.L.A.; J.D., U.C.L.A.; an associate in the Los Angeles law firm
of Hahn Cazier Hoegh & Leff. This article was derived from a memorandum
submitted by the author as a portion of a project for the Authors Subcommittee
of the Patent, Trademark and Copyright Section of the American Bar Associa-
tion in 1974.
1. The Law of Copyright is enacted by Congress pursuant to its power
under the Constitution, article I, section 8, clause 8 which grants Congress the
power:
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.
2. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, effective July 1, 1909. The act
was enacted into positive law as 17 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. by the Act of July 30, 1947,
ch. 391, 61 Stat. 652.
3. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541. Although this Act provides that, with
minor exception, its provisions do not become operative until January 1, 1978,
for purposes of convenience the law in effect until that date will be referred to
herein as the "old law" while the law in effect after that date will be referred to
herein as the "new law".
words, and for that reason rigid and not susceptible to easy
application to new technologies.4 The old law was indeed short,
consisting of sections of limited length and totalling only ap-
proximately 23 pages minus annotations, as published in United
States Code Annotated by West Publishing Co. The new law, on
the other hand, not including the transitional sections, consists
of some 57 pages, as published as Public Law 94-553. The new
law also contains several sections which are each several pages
in length. Compared to the law which it replaces, the new law is
indeed, corpulent. Whether the new law lives up to its promise of
settling various issues which have recently vexed the courts
with respect to copyright is yet to be seen. A partial overview of
the new law, however, demonstrates that it raises perhaps as
many problems as it solves, and may very well not have the
promised flexibility, nor solve the problems which gave rise to
its enactment in the first place.5
DEFINITIONS
Unlike the old law which has no section dealing exclusively
with the definition of the various terms and phrases which ap-
pear throughout the law, the new law does contain such a sec-
tion. Section 101 defines various phrases and words used
throughout the new law which definitions appear for the most
part to conform to the meanings of those words as they are
understood whether in general usage, or as used by the courts
with respect to the old law. However, definitions given to certain
words and phrases are so ambiguous or incomplete that further
modification will be required either by congressional amend-
ment or judicial gloss. Certainly, to the extent that a controversy
arises wherein the definition proves to be important, both
copyright owners and copyright users should take care to ex-
plore the existing ambiguities,6 some of which are examined
below.
4. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(majority opinion), 165 (dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun), 168 (dissenting
opinion of Chief Justice Burger) (1975); and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 415-16(1974).
5. This partial overview concentrates almost exclusively on Chapter One
of the new law. Chapter One is entitled "Subject Matter and Scope of
Copyright" and it is the heart of the new law. As this article is intended as an
overview it will not deal with each section in Chapter One. For a view with
respect to other portions of the new law see A.S. KATZ, The 1976 Copyright
Revision Act and Authors' Rights: A Negative Overview, 4 PEPPERDINE L. R.
171 (1977).
6. For some words used throughout the act no definition is provided by
Section 101. An example is the word "dramatic". In several sections, e.g. 110,
115, and 116, the extent of the author's rights with respect to the work depends
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Audiovisual Works and Motion Pictures
The new law defines audiovisual works as...
works that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically
intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices such as
projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accom-
panying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material ob-
jects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied.7
It would appear from this definition that the term "audiovisu-
al works" is intended to relate to the work as finally perceived
by a viewer, regardless of the physical object on which the work
is embodied, e.g., whether it be film or tape. However, as the
definition speaks of a series of related images, it creates an
ambiguity. As most people of common knowledge are aware
videotape, unlike film, does not of itself appear to contain any
images when viewed by the naked eye, related or otherwise.
When viewed by the naked eye it is impossible to tell whether
the videotape is blank, contains only sounds, or sounds and
information which, when digested by appropriate electronic
machinery, will create an image on a television screen. Film, on
the other hand, does consist of a series of related images which
are readily apparent to the naked eye. The necessity of the
phrase "series of related images" is therefore not clear. Would a
work fail as an audiovisual work if it consisted solely of a single
image which did not vary throughout the work but was accom-
panied with the sounds of an off-camera narration describing
the image?
The definition of "motion pictures" is that they are" .. au-
diovisual works consisting of a series of related images which
when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion,
together with accompanying sounds, if any."8 Defining motion
pictures as those audiovisual works (which by their own defini-
tion are to consist of a series of related images) which consist of
a series of related images which impart an impression of motion
thus further adds to the confusion concerning the meaning of
on a finding that the work is either dramatic or not dramatic. As is noted by
Professor Nimmer in his treatise, the cases in this area have not fashioned a
comprehensive definition of the meaning of dramatic. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
16.1 (1976). Even though the distinction can be critical to the author's rights in his
work, the new law provides no further guidance than existed prior to its
passage.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (New law).
8. Id. (emphasis added).
the phrase "series of related images." Apparently motion pic-
tures are intended to be a sub-class of audiovisual works, au-
diovisual works being all works consisting of a series of related
images (however defined) while motion pictures are those
works within that category which also impart an impression of
motion. But, if to satisfy the general definition of audiovisual
works it is not necessary for the work to impart an impression
of motion, the need for the work to consist of a series of related
images is mystifying; particularly in light of the fact that the
nature of the material object in which the work is embodied is
irrelevant.
It would appear from the Report of the House of Representa-
tives that the purpose of the "series of related images" require-
ment was to include within audiovisual works works such as
film strips, slide sets and sets of transparencies rather than
placing those items within the classification of pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural works.9 If this is the case, then it would
appear the phrase "a series of related images" should itself have
a definition to the effect that it implies images placed in a
specific sequence or order by the author of the work, the rela-
tion arising by the work of the author and not referring to an
inherent relationship between the images themselves as ulti-
mately perceived. The act itself, however, does not compel this
conclusion.
Copies and Phonorecords
The definitions for these two terms make it clear that they
relate to the "material objects" in which the work is fixed by any
method now known or later developed.' 0 Copies are essentially
all material objects while phonorecords are material objects in
which sounds other than those accompanying a motion picture
9. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 122 at 56 (1976), together with
additional views to accompanying S.22 [the General Revisions of Copyright Bill]
of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives [hereinafter, the
HOUSE REPORT].
10. "Copies" and "Phonorecords" are defined by § 101 as:
'Copies' are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a
work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term
'copies' includes the material object, other than a phonorecord, in
which the work is first fixed. * * * 'Phonorecords' are material objects
in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later
developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device. The term 'phonorecords' includes the material ob-ject in which the sounds are first fixed.
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or other audiovisual work are fixed. These terms appear to be
all encompassing and appear generally together throughout the
new law. According to the House Report, fixation of a work is
one of the two statutory criteria for copyright protection, the
other being originality." The Report continues and points out
that the purpose of these definitions is to prevent unnecessary
and artificial distinctions between the works of an author and
the form, manner or medium in which the work is fixed or
embodied. 12 The definitions of copies and phonorecords are,
together, to comprise all material objects in which works of an
author are fixed by any method now known or later
developed.
13
Created and Derivative Work
The definitions of "created" and "derivative work," while
each is indeed intended to cover separate territory, present an
overlap which may cause confusion.14 The definition of
"created" is of critical importance under the new law as it is the
11. HOUSE REPORT, note 9, supra at 51.
12. An early example of this distinction is found in White-Smith Publica-
tions Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). See also, HOUSE REPORT at 52-53.
13. The definitions of these terms [copies and phonorecords] in section
101, together with their usage in section 102 and throughout the bill,
reflect a fundamental distinction between the original work which is
the product of 'authorship' and the multitude of material objects in
which it can be embodied. Thus, in the sense of the bill, a 'book' is not a
work of authorship, but is a particular kind of 'copy'. Instead, the
author may write a 'literary work' which in turn can be embodied in a
wide range of 'copies' and 'phonorecords', including books, periodicals,
computer punch cards, microfilm, tape recordings, and so forth.
HOUSE REPORT at 53. This concept is fundamental to the new law and is one
which will require an adjustment in the language used by most authors and
copyright practitioners. As the HOUSE REPORT example demonstrates, an author
will no longer write a book, nor a song writer a musical; rather, they will create
respectively a literary work and a musical work. The material object in which•
the respective works are first fixed will then become copies or phonorecords.
14. A work is 'created' when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the
first time; where a work is prepared over a period of time, the portion
of it that has been fixed at any particular time constitutes the work as
of that time, and where the work has been prepared in different ver-
sions, each version constitutes a separate work."
A 'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fic-
tionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduc-
tion, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may
be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revi-
sions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a
whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 'derivative work'.
Pub. L. No. 94-533, 90 Stat. 2542; 17 U.S.C. § 101 (New law).
fixation of a new work in a copy or phonorecord for the first
time which constitutes one of the two fundamental steps re-
quired to invoke copyright protection. 15 If this were the full
definition of "created," there would be no confusion. However,
the definition continues and provides that where a work or a
portion of it has been fixed at any particular time it constitutes
the work as of that time, and that where the work has been
prepared in different versions, each version constitutes a sepa-
rate work. 6
A derivative work is defined as a work which is based upon
one or more "pre-existing works." The definition also states that
a work consisting of "editorial revisions, annotations, elabora-
tions, or other modifications" may also constitute a derivative
work.17 The question then arises whether every succeeding
draft of a literary work and every preliminary sketch used by an
artist prior to creating a pictorial work (as they are each fixed,
i.e., created) is itself a separate work, or a derivative work. It
would appear from the definitions that each draft or successive
sketch would constitute a different version of its predecessor as
each became fixed, and that each would likewise also constitute
a derivative work of its predecessor. Whether each successive
work is a separate work or a derivative work, it is imperative
that the author (using that term in its constitutional sense to
include all who create copyrightable works) be sternly lectured
to prevent all publication of such drafts or preliminary sketches
unless they are published with the notice required by the new
law. Should the author fail to follow this prescription he may
needlessly dedicate a previously published and fully copyright-
ed work to the public domain. 18
15. See note 11 supra.
16. See note 14 supra.
17. Id.
18. This conclusion follows because under the new law, as under the old, a
derivative work may only protect that which is original to it, and not that which
was subject to protection or protected as the work upon which it was based. See
Section 103(b) of the new law and HouSE REPORT, note 9, supra at 57. If a
copyright owner allows the publication of a prior work, upon which the ulti-
mately published and copyright derivative work was based, without appro-
priate notice, that prior draft or sketch enters the public domain. Being in the
public domain, the expression of the work as contained in the prior draft or
sketch can be freely used without compensation to the copyright owner of the
earlier published derivative work. Thus, whether succeeding drafts or sketches
are treated as separate works under the definition of "created", or as derivative
works, it is apparent that under the new law each has its own separate and
distinct legal identity. Accordingly, each draft or version must be guarded and
treated by the author at all times as a separate work, subject to copyright
protection, and subject to divesting the author of his copyright if due diligence is
not pursued.
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Pictorial, Graphic and Sculptural Works and Useful Articles
The definitions given these terms provide the battleground
upon which some of the most interesting controversies may be
fought with respect to the scope of the new law.19 The battle-
ground, indeed, may have constitutional proportions. Under the
definition of pictorial, graphic and sculptural works the new
law includes technical drawings, diagrams and models. Also
included are works of artistic craftsmanship and designs for a
useful article, but only to the extent that such design incorpo-
rates "pictorial, graphic or sculptural features that can be iden-
tified separately from, and are capable of existing independent-
ly of the utilitarian aspects of the article. '20 The definition of a
useful article is convoluted, requiring a consideration of
whether the article has an instrinsic utilitarian function which is
not merely the portrayal of the article or the transmission of
information. A definition of this definition would be helpful.
The House Report discusses these definitions in connection with
its evaluation of section 102 of the new law. Its discussion,
unfortunately, stops short of answering the critical question of
how the line is to be drawn between that which can be identified
separately from and is capable of existing independently of the
utilitarian aspect of the useful article (and is therefore subject to
full copyright protection as a pictorial, graphic or sculptural
work) and that which cannot.21
19. 'Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works' include two-dimensional
and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photo-
graphics, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, technical
drawings, diagrams, and models. Such works shall include works of
artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or
utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article, as
defined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incor-
porates pictorial( graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the
utilitarian aspects of the article.
A 'useful article' is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function
that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey
information. An article that is normally a part of a useful article is
considered a 'useful article'.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (new law).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (new law).
21. The HOUSE REPORT states, with respect to the line drawing problem that
[o]n the other hand, although the shape of an industrial product may be
aesthetically satisfying and valuable, the Committee's intention is not
to offer it copyright protection under the bill. Unless the shape of an
automobile, airplane, lady's dress, food processor, television set, or any
Further, according to the House Report,22 the definitions of
pictorial, graphic and sculptural works and of useful articles are
to be consistent with the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Mazer v. Stein.23 In that case, the Court ruled that a
statuette which was the base of a lamp was a writing in the
constitutional sense and, accordingly subject to copyright. More
recently, in Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer,24 Judge Gesell ruled that
light fixtures which serve both to decorate and to illuminate,
must, consistent with Mazer v. Stein, be afforded copyright
protection. The court thereupon entered summary judgment in
favor of Esquire, Inc. compelling defendant Ringer, the Register
of Copyrights, to register the item for copyright. The court ruled
that even though the Register insisted that utilitarian objects
with aesthetic shape could not be copyrighted, Mazer v. Stein
holds to the contrary. In this regard the court ruled:
These outdoor lights serve both to decorate and to illuminate. Indeed,
during the day they are exclusively decorative. They are a type of
sculpture which is both original and aesthetically pleasing. Surely,
they would satisfy a Gropius or Brancusi far more than would a
Rembrandt portrait, and to many they are more artistic than some
examples of sculpture found at such museums as the Corcoran or the
Hirshhorn. Art through the ages has often served a utilitarian pur-
pose. The Caryatids of the Acropolis or Cellini's exquisite Saltcellar
are two of the many examples of traditional art serving such a pur-
pose. There has always been a close link between art and science. The
forms represented by Esquire's fixtures emphasize line and shape
rather than the realistic or the ornate but it is not for the Register to
reject them on artistic grounds, Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithograph-
ing Co., supra, or because the form is accommodated to a utilitarian
purpose, Mazer v. Stein, supra. There cannot be and there should not
be any national standard of what constitutes art and the pleasing
forms of the Esquire fixtures are entitled to the same recognition
afforded more traditional sculpture.2 5
Under the new law the result would be the same. According to
other industrial product contain some element that, physically or con-
ceptually, can be identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of
that article, the design would not be copyrighted under the bill. The test
of separability and independence from the 'utilitarian aspects of the
article' does not depend upon the nature of the design that is, even if the
appearance of an article is determined by aesthetic (as opposed to
functional) considerations, only elements, if any, which can be iden-
tified separately from the useful article are as such copyrightable and,
even if the three dimensional design contains some such element (for
example, a carving on the back of a chair or a floral relief design on
silver flatware) copyright protection would extend only to that element,
and would not cover the overall configuration of the utilitarian article
as such. HOUSE REPORT, Note 9, supra at 54-55.
This statement by the Committee offers no more assistance to those who will be
called upon to litigate and to judge than does the act itself.
22. Id. at 54.
23. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
24. 414 F. Supp. 939 (D.D.C. 1976).
25. Id. at 941 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
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the Court in Esquire, during the daytime the outdoor fixtures
were entirely decorative, i.e., not utilitarian. Accordingly, they
were in their entirety capable of existing independently of their
utilitarian aspect. The language of the new law thus seems to be
broader than the statements of the Committee as expressed in
the House Report. Under the statements contained in the House
Report, though the fixtures in Esquire were of an aesthetically
satisfying and valuable shape, this would be an inadequate dis-
tinction to allow copyright. The House Report seems to call for
the very consideration which the United States Supreme Court
in Mazer v. Stein and the district court in Esquire ruled to be
impermissible-a consideration by the Register of Copyrights
of what is, and what is not, art. The broad language of the House
Report in connection with the ambiguous language of the defini-
tions of pictorial, graphic, sculptural works and useful articles
will certainly lead to confusion. The approach of the courts in
Mazer v. Stein and Esquire is more satisfying. As this approach
is intended to be followed by the new law,2 6 the new law must be
read to extend copyright, rather than to limit it, when the work
in question has a utilitarian function.
An additional line drawing problem presented by the "useful
article" limitation on pictorial, graphic and sculptural works is
the extent to which copyright is available for architectural
drawings. The House Report acknowledges that the architect's
plans and drawings would, of course be protected by copyright.
However, the extent of that protection is to be dependent upon
the circumstances.
2 7
Purely non-functional or monumental structures would be subject to
full copyright protection under the bill, and the same would be true of
artistic sculpture or decorative ornamentation or embellishment ad-
ded to a structure. On the other hand, where the only elements of
shape in an architectural design are conceptually inseparable from
utilitarian aspects of the structure, copyright protection for the design
would not be available.28
However, where is the line to be drawn for an architectural
design for a home, for example. As anyone who has ever visited
26. See note 19 supra.
27. HOUSE REPORT, note 9, supra at 55. For a discussion of the copyrighta-
bility of architectural drawings under the old law, see A.S. Katz, Copyright
Protection of Architectural Plans, Drawings and Designs, 19 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB 224 (1954).
28. HOUSE REPORT, Note 9, supra at 55.
the sales office of a new residential development is aware, the
builder frequently has three or four floor plans, each of which
has two, three or more different frontal elevations. One eleva-
tion may consist of a wholly smooth-stuccoed exterior with a
crushed-rock roof. Another may have a brick exterior with a
shake roof, and a third a rough stuccoed exterior designed to
resemble adobe mission exterior with a spanish tile roof. Like-
wise, even given the limitation of being compelled to design a
four-bedroom house with two bathrooms, a living room, dining
room, kitchen and recreation room consisting of approximately
2,000 square feet, any architect worthy of his title would certain-
ly be able to design several floor plans which would each meet
those utilitarian criteria, but which would also each comprise a
different work of the architect's artistry. A house is per se
utilitarian. However, each separate expression of that four-
bedroom house exhibits its individual artistic layout and eleva-
tion which sets it apart from any other work by any other ar-
chitect. It can thus be readily argued that every house taken as a
whole is an artistic work separate and apart from its utilitarian
aspects. As such, not only should the architect's two-
dimensional plans and drawings be protected by copyright, but
so too should the house ultimately built from those plans and
drawings be protected. The house would certainly be a material
object, and it would likewise be a three-dimensional fixation of
the architect's artistic endeavors. Further, as the three-
dimensional work would be based upon one or more pre-
existing works (the two-dimensional drawings), it would be a
derivative work. Presuming that the architect had properly pro-
tected his drawings, the expression of his work in the material
object of the three-dimensional structure should therefore itself
be protectable. The language of the House Report would thus
seem to be unduly restrictive, particularly in light of Mazer v.
Stein and Esquire and inconsistent with the sage advice of
those courts that it is not a function of the copyright law to
determine that which is art and therefore, subject to protection
and that which is not.29
29. Title II of S.22 provided specific, limited, short-term protection for
ornamental designs and useful articles and works of applied art. The House
amendment to S.22, which consisted in essence of the House version of the
revised copyright law, deleted Title II in its entirety. This amended version was
approved at the House-Senate Conference and Title II was thus deleted from the
Act as adopted. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 122 (1976).
(hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT). The reasons for the deletion by the House of
Title II are set forth in the HOUSE REPORT at pages 49-50. To the extent that a bill
in the nature of Title II is considered in the future as a separate enactment, or as
further amendment of the new law, the Congress would be well advised to
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The Divisibility of Copyright
A salutory step taken by the new law is the conclusion
inherent in the definition of the phrase "transfer of copyright
ownership" that a copyright owner may deal separately and
individually with each of the various rights contained in a
copyright.3 ° In other words, it is now clear that a copyright is not
a single right that is not divisible, but rather, is indeed a bundle
of rights, each of which may be separately assigned, mortgaged,
licensed, conveyed alienated or hypothecated. Previously, the
indivisibility doctrine that a copyright was but a single right was
a subject of controversy. 31
THE SUBJECT MATTER OF COPYRIGHT, SECTION 102
Section 102, in subpart (a) basically provides that copyright
protection exists for original works of authorship fixed in some
tangible medium of expression whether or not a machine or
device is needed to perceive, reproduce or otherwise communi-
cate the work. Works of authorship are specified to "include"
seven categories, with the word include being defined by sec-
tion 101 as a word of illustration and not limitation. 32 Subpart (b)
of section 102 makes clear that copyright protection extends
ohly to the expression of the work and not to ideas, principals or
concepts. In this regard, the new law is consistent with the old.
According to the House Report, the phrase "original works of
authorship" in section 102(a) was used for purpose of ex-
pressly avoiding the exhaustion of the constitutional power of
Congress to legislate in the field.33 Notwithstanding the lan-
consider carefully the effect of such legislation on that group of authors known
as architects, and to make it clear that architects maintain the copyright not
only to the two-dimensional drawings created by them but also to the ultimate
structure, a derivative work, created from those two-dimensional drawings.
30. "Transfer of Copyright Ownership" is defined in § 101 as: "A 'transfer
of copyright ownership' is an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any
other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the
exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or
place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license." (Emphasis added).
31. See, e.g., Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc., 425 F.2d 397 (2d Cir.
1970).
32. The seven categories are literary works, musical works, dramatic
works, pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial, graphic and sculptural
works, motion pictures and other audiovisual works and sound recordings. See,
also, HOUSE REPORT, note 9, supra at 53.
33. HOUSE REPORT at 51. The HOUSE REPORT continues:
Authors are continually finding new ways of expressing themselves,
but it is impossible to foresee the forms that these new expressive
223
guage of the House Report, all writings (in the constitutional
sense), when fixed, would seem to be subject to federal protec-
tion under sections 102, 103, and 301(a).34
With respect to section 102(b), the effect of this section must
be viewed in light of its purpose. The purpose of section 102(b)
may be to state that the works therein listed are indeed "writ-
ings" in the constitutional sense, but that Congress chooses not
to protect them by the new law. If so, the result is that any works
falling in this category by reason of federal preemption, would
not be subject to either federal or state protection under the
doctrine of the Sears and Compco cases.35 However, if the in-
tent of section 102(b) is to state that works falling under it are
not "writings" in the constitutional sense, and that accordingly
Congress has no power to legislate with respect to any of such
works, then the states would be at liberty to protect such works
under state law without fear of federal preemption.3 6 Congress
may not preempt where it has no constitutional power to act.37
The Supreme Court has never decided what the limits are of the
term "writings" as used in the United States Constitution article
I, section 8, clause 8. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion in
Mazer v. Stein, urged that case be set down for reargument so
that the scope of the term "writings" could be properly dis-
cussed in terms of its constitutional limits. 38 According to the
House Report, section 102(b) is intended merely to restate in the
new law that the distinction between protection of the expres-
sion and non-protection of the idea remains unchanged. 39 Pro-
tection for the items specified in section 102(b) under state law
is then still possible to the extent the items set forth therein are
methods will take. The bill does not intend either to freeze the scope of
copyrightable technology or to allow unlimited expansion into areas
completely outside the present congressional intent. Section 102 im-
plies neither that this subject matter is unlimited nor that new forms of
expression within that general area of subject matter would necessari-
ly be unprotected.
34. Section 301(a) preempts state protection for any work when it is fixed if
it is subject to § 102 or 103. Section 301(d) revives in part Goldstein v. California,
412 U.S. 546 (1973).
35. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), and Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). The basic tenet of these
cases is that when a product is capable of being but is not protected by federal
patent or copyright protection it may not be protected under a state unfair
competition statute as federal law preempts and the product is thrust into the
public domain.
36. See, also, § 301(b) which specifically allows State law protection for
works not "within the subject matter of copyright as specified in Sections 102
and 103, including works of authorship not fixed in any tangible medium of
expression", and Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
37. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 552-53 (1973).
38. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219-21 (1954).
39. HOUSE REPORT, note 9, supra at 57.
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not writings in the constitutional sense, and thus not properly
within the power of Congress to protect or preempt.
THE AUTHOR'S EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS IN COPYRIGHTED
WORKS, SECTION 106
The purpose of section 106 is to provide all rights to the
copyright owner, dependent upon the type of work involved,
subject to the limitations of sections 107 through 118. Apart
from the constitutional challenge to sections 107 through 118,
which will be discussed infra, section 106 seems to be unneces-
sarily restrictive. The restriction is primarily one of omission
and oversight. For instance, with respect to subparts 4 and 5 of
section 106, which give the copyright owner of certain
categories of works the right to perform or display the copy-
righted work publically, there is no provision made for
copyrighted works not among the categories listed in section
102. As discussed above, it seems quite clear from section 102
itself, and from the House Report that other categories of works
not listed may very well be the natural subject matter of
copyright without the need of additional congressional action.
Yet, even if those other works are similar in nature to literary,
musical, dramatic, choreographic, pantomime, motion picture
or other audiovisual works or sound recordings, the owner of
that new but unenumerated category of work would not have
the right to perform or display the copyrighted work publically.
As the stated purpose of the new law is to provide greater
flexibility with respect to artistic works made possible by new
technological developments, additional language in sections 4
and 5 such as "or similar works" or "works of a similar nature to
the enumerated works" ought to be added by amendment, or if
not by amendment then surely by judicial gloss.
With respect to the previously discussed dilemma of that class
of authors known as architects, unless the three-dimensional
structure depicted by the two-dimensional architectural plans
and drawings is considered a derivative work, section 106 fails
to give the architect the right to prevent the unauthorized build-
ing of the structure depicted in his copyrighted plans and draw-
ings. Having created and obtained copyright protection for his
architectural drawings, the architect has indeed a hollow
copyright if he cannot prevent a third party from reproducing
the structure depicted in those plans and drawings. A third
party would merely have to take the necessary measurements
from a structure previously built according to those plans and
drawings, and from those measurements create a new structure
virtually identical with that depicted in the copyrighted plans
and drawings. Unless the ultimate structure is a derivative
work, the architect has no meaningful copyright at all in his
copyrighted plans and drawings.
SECTIONS 107 THROUGH 118, LIMITATIONS ON THE
AUTHOR'S EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS; A POSSIBLE
CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY
The constitutional provision granting Congress the power
to legislate in the area of copyright provides that:
The Congress shall have Power ... to promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.
40
The old law limited the author's term of copyright to 28 years
with a renewal, but made his rights within that time period
relatively exclusive. 41 The only limitations in the old law were
the so-called juke box exemption, the compulsory license provi-
sions, and the court-created exception of fair use.42 Although
section 106 of the new law provides that the copyright owner
shall have exclusive rights, a number of statutory limitations on
those exclusive rights, make them in essence non-exclusive, and
are inflicted through sections 107 through 118. In addition, the
duration of the remaining rights is extended to the life of the
author plus 50 years.43 The constitutional question, therefore, is
whether Congress may properly enact legislation purportedly
under the directive of the Constitution to secure for "limited
times" to authors and inventors the "exclusive right" to their
respective writings and discoveries, when the limited time is the
life of the author plus 50 years, and the "exclusive right" is
limited by the allowance of significant copying without the ap-
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, Cl. 8.
41. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970) (old law).
42. 17 U.S.C. §§ l(e) and 101(e) (1970), and Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v.
Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009
(1967). These exemptions represent areas in the old copyright law where en-
croachment upon the exclusive rights of copyright ownership are permitted.
The juke box and compulsory license exemptions are statutory dilutions of the
exclusivity of copyright in reproductions of musical non-dramatic works. The
fair use exception is a judicial encroachment on the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner which is applied where the use of the copyright material is
without the owner's consent, but nonetheless made in a reasonable manner.
43. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (new law).
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proval of the author, and without compensation to the author.
Nimmer, in his treatise, suggests that the proposed term of life
plus 50 years will pass constitutional muster.44 He acknowl-
edges, however, that no cases exist which have considered th&
issue.45 Under the law of patents enacted pursuant to the same
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, and governed by the same "limited
times" and "exclusive rights" language, the rights given the
inventor seem far more consistent with the constitutional man-
date. The term is for only 17 years and is not subject to renewal,
but the exclusivity is such that a patent, when issued, will even
prevent a third person who independently invents that same
item from enjoying the fruits of that labor.46
The Court in Goldstein v. California,47 suggests that as to
those works which are writings in the constitutional sense, the
Court could choose to deny them federal copyright protection,
and also preempt state protection.48 This, of course, is the ulti-
mate non-exclusive protection. The reasoning is that Congress,
having the power to grant exclusive rights, can certainly choose
to grant less than exclusive rights. However, if the copyright
owner can convince the Court that Congress' power to act with
respect to copyrights is exclusively governed by the copyright
clause,49 and that Congress' power must be exercised consis-
tently with the constitutional source of that power then, Con-
gress must do so by securing to the author for limited times the
exclusive right to their writings, and no less. The new law, then,
at least insofar as it places limitations upon those exclusive
rights, would be unconstitutional. The success of any such chal-
44. 1 Nimmer on Copyright, § S.1 at 8 (1976).
45. Id. See however the dissenting views of Representative Robert F. Dri-
nan to S.3976 (a bill dealing with copyright extension for sound recordings and
extension of the renewal term of expiring copyrights for two additional years)
as reported in H.R. REP. No. 1581, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 17 (1974), in which Repre-
sentative Drinan expresses some doubt as to the constitutionality of the mere
two year extension there involved, particularly when ". . . many of the inven-
tors and authors, whose product we seek to protect, have been dead for a very
long time."
46. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
395 U.S. 100 (1969); and Little Mule Corp. v. Lug All Co., 254 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 838 (1958).
47. 412 U.S. 546, 555-58 (1973).
48. Id. at 559.
49. See, 1 Nimmer on Copyright, § 9.1 at 27-28 (1976) for the suggestion that
Congress could enact copyright legislation under the commerce clause.
lenge cannot be predicted. The fact that the doctrine of fair use
was created first by the courts and only later by the Congress, in
the form of section 107 of the new law, may not bode well for
any such challenge. That challenge has not yet been made, nor
lost, and it should not be overlooked.
FAIR USE, SECTION 107
The purpose of section 107 is to codify the judicially created
doctrine of fair use, which grants the user a limited right to
invade the author's copyright without being subject to an action
for damages or injunction for infringement. 0 Section 107 sets
forth four criteria which are to be considered by a court in
determining whether a particular use of the work was fair.
According to the House Report, no real definition of the concept
of fair use has ever emerged, the doctrine being essentially an
equitable rule of reason.5 1 The four criteria provided are pur-
portedly those which have tended to reoccur in the cases discus-
sing fair use.52 Unfortunately, little guidance is given by the
Congress in section 107 as to how these four criteria are to be
applied. Congress may very well have been able to obtain the
same result by not even mentioning the illustrative criteria. With
respect to the four criteria listed, it is clear that they are not the
exclusive criteria that courts may consider. Thus, the section
states that the factors to be considered shall "include" the
enumerated four criteria. As set forth above, the word "include"
is defined as being a word of illustration and not limitation.53
The House Report goes on to expressly state that "[b]eyond a
very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of
the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt a
doctrine to particular situations on a case by case basis. Section
107 is intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair
use, not to change, narrow or enlarge it in any way."54 Section
107 thus neither adds to nor subtracts from the law of copyright
as it existed prior to the enactment of the new statute. However,
both authors and users must be vigilant in applying section 107
50. See, e.g., Rosemont Enterprises Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d
303 (2d Cir. 1966).
51. HOUSE REPORT, note 9, supra at 65.
52. See Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2546. The four
criteria provided are (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes; (2)
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
53. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (new law).
54. HOUSE REPORT, note 9, supra at 66.
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as it would seemingly be very easy to limit one's discussion to
the court criteria given even though the statute and the reports
expressly state that other criteria may also be considered in
ruling on a defense of fair use.
A further problem with respect to the fair use exemption is
that it may ultimately swallow up each of the other limitations
and exemptions provided in sections 108 through 118, with the
result that the very carefully designed balancing of interests
reflected in those sections will be for naught, users being al-
lowed to disregard limitations imposed in specified circumst-
ances on the basis that though their use is broader than allowed
by a given section, it is nonetheless a fair use within section 107.
That such a result is not mere idle speculation is readily ap-
parent in section 108. Section 108 provides, in over two full
pages of script, carefully constructed criteria with respect to
when, and in what manner libraries and archives may make
photocopies of copyrighted works without violating that
copyright. Section 108 was undoubtedly motivated in part by
the decision of the United States Court of Claims in Williams &
Wilkins Company v. United States.5 In that case the wholesale
and systematic photocopying of entire articles, and on occasion
entire journals was routinely undertaken by two libraries or
archives which are arms of the United States Government.
Nonetheless, the court of claims ruled that this wholesale, sys-
tematic and intentional copying of copyrighted articles and
journals was a fair use and not subject to any copyright limita-
tion. The copying by these libraries greatly exceeded the copy-
ing that they could properly do if they were governed by the
requirements of section 108. However, section 108(f) provides
that nothing in section 108 shall in any way affect the right of
fair use as provided by section 107. Thus, it would appear that
even after the enactment of the new law the libraries involved in
the Williams & Wilkins case could continue, unabated, and
without regard to the limitations of section 108, their wholesale
copying under the guise of fair use.
Other sections limiting the copyright users right to invade the
copyright owner's copyright without liability do not expressly
deal with the applicability of section 107. It is rather apparent
55. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973) affd. 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
however from the House Report that section 107 is arguably
applicable in all cases. Thus, the House Report states that
the concentrated attention given the fair use provision in the context
of classroom teaching activities should not obscure its application in
other areas. It must be emphasized again that the same general stan-
dards of fair use are applicable to all kinds of uses for copyrighted
material although the relative weight to be given them will differ from
case to case.
56
COPYING By LIBRARIES AND ARCHIVES, SECTION 108
Section 108 of the new law grants certain libraries and ar-
chives the right to make copies of copyrighted works, both por-
tions of articles and entire journals, without infringing the au-
thor's copyright. Although no such specific exemption exists in
the old law, the court of claims decision in Williams & Wilkins
granting the libraries there involved rights to copy under the
doctrine of fair use overshadows section 108.
Section 108 provides that a library or archive, if it meets
certain conditions set forth in subpart (a), may produce one
copy of a copyrighted work at any given time. Wisely, subdivi-
sion (g) while allowing more than one copy to be made if made at
isolated and unrelated times, limits the exemption provided by
section 108 where the library or archive, or its employees are
aware or have the substantial reason to believe that the copying
is the related or concerted reproduction of the same material or
is the systematic reproduction or distribution of the material.
However, the new law does not require the library or the person
requesting the photocopy to demonstrate that an unused copy
of the work cannot be obtained at a normal price from common-
ly known trade sources before the copy is made, except in the
situation as set forth in section 108(c) of replacing a damaged,
deteriorating, lost or stolen copy or phonorecord. If an unused
copy can be obtained at a fair price from the publisher or the
copyright owner, no ready justification should exist for allow-
ing the free copying of any work in any circumstance.
As set forth above, those aspects of section 108 which might
be considered salutory will be of little value if indeed the fair
use exemption of section 107 can properly override all the
criteria laid down in section 108. Section 108(f)(4) seems to
allow for that result, and the decision of the court in Williams &
Wilkins being, as it is, based upon the doctrine of fair use,
would likewise compel such a result. Section 108(f)(4) does, at
least, allow the copyright owner to obtain an agreement from
56. HousE REPORT, note 9, supra at 72.
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subscribers limiting their rights to copy. To the extent a
copyright owner can obtain such an agreement from a library
or archive, he would certainly be well advised to do so, particu-
larly one specifying that the Williams & Wilkins version of fair
use will not apply.
THE EXEMPTION OF CERTAIN PERFORMANCES AND DISPLAYS FROM
THE SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION, SECTION 110
Section 110 of the new law provides certain limitations on the
right of the copyright owner to sue for damages for infringe-
ment, when the work is being performed or displayed for pur-
poses which can be generally described as educational, reli-
gious, or otherwise nonprofit in nature. On the one hand, sec-
tion 110 contains elements which are beneficial to authors, de-
fining more clearly and with greater limitation, the extent of the
use, through performance or display, that can be made of a
work without infringement. On the other hand, section 110 con-
tains elements so poorly drafted, either intentionally or through
oversight, that the protection given the copyright owner is
meaningless.
A prime example of the deficiency of section 110 is found in
subpart 4. On the positive side, subpart 4 makes clear that a use
of a work by performance, as in The Robert Stigwood Group
Ltd. v. O'Reilly,57 would clearly be impermissible.5 8 Subpart 4
provides that if a notice of objection to performance, in form
and content as authorized by the Register of Copyrights, is
served on the user, the exemption of subpart 4 is lost. However,
in a most ludicrous fashion the new law provides that the notice
of objection must be served by the copyright owner at least
seven days before the date of performance.5 9 Amazingly, there
is no requirement, however, that the copyright user give any
notice to the copyright owner of an intent to use the work. Thus,
the right to object to the performance is wholly illusory unless
57. 346 F. Supp. 376 (D.Conn. 1972).
58. In Robert Stigwood, supra, a group of Catholic priests engaged in
producing over 50 productions of the rock opera, Jesus Christ Superstar, using
professionial paid actors. The defendants sought to excuse their infringement of
plaintiff's copyright by relying upon the not-for-profit exemption found in Sec-
tion 104 of the old law. The court considered their defense but ultimately ruled
against them. Under the new law, the inability of defendants to raise such a
defense is even more clear.
59. 17 U.S.C. § 1l0(4)(B)(ii) (new law).
by pure happenstance a copyright owner should learn at least
seven days before the date of the performance that his work is
to be performed.
Subpart 5 of section 110 contains another balancing of inter-
ests between copyright owners and users which, although well
intended, may fail to fulfill its stated purpose as expressed by
the House Report. Subpart 5 deals with the common situation of
the use by a business proprietor of a radio, television or stereo
phonograph or tape system to provide background or mood
music for his establishment. Prior to the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken,60 it was generally understood that an earlier case, Buck
v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co.61 made such use an infringement
of the copyright of those works being so performed. In Aiken,
however, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the use by
a business proprietor of a home radio receiver with four ordi-
nary loud speakers placed throughout the business establish-
ment, which was relatively small in size, would not be a per-
formance by the business proprietor and therefore was not an
infringement. 62 The avowed purpose of the new law was to limit
or overturn Aiken and to revitalize the rule of Jewell-LaSalle.63
60. 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
61. 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
62. 422 U.S. at 164.
63. The majority of the Supreme Court in the Aiken 'case based its
decision on a narrow construction of the word 'perform' in the 1909
statute. This basis for the decision is completely overturned by the
present bill and its broad definition of 'perform' in Section 101. The
Committee has adopted the language of Section 101(5), with an amend-
ment expressly denying the exemption in situations where 'the per-
formance or display is further transmitted beyond the place where the
receiving apparatus is located'; in doing so, it accepts the traditionally,
pre-Aiken interpretation of the Jewell-LaSalle decision, under which
public communication by means other than a home receiving set, or
further transmission of a broadcast to the public, is considered an
infringing act. HOUSE REPORT, note 9, supra at 87.
While the Conference Committee did not adopt the House language, the legisla-
tive intent remained unchanged.
With respect to Section 110(5), the conference substitute conforms to
the language in the Senate bill. It is the intent of the conferees that a
small commercial establishment of the type involved in Twentieth Cen-
tury Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975), which merely augmented
a home-type receiver and which was not of sufficient size to justify, as a
practical matter, a subscription to a commercial background music
service, would be exempt. However, where the public communication
was by means of something other than a home-ty e receiving ap-
paratus, or where the establishment actually makes a Further transmis-
sion to the public, the exemption would not apply. CONFERENCE RE-
PORT, note 29, supra at 75.
A further problem of Section 110(5) is its interrelation with § 11l(a)(1). Section
111 as discussed, infra, deals with exemptions from infringement for certain
secondary transmissions. Under § 11l(a)(1) a secondary transmission, when not
by a cable system, by the management of a hotel or apartment house, or similar
establishment, to the private rooms of guests or residents, for which no direct
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The problem with subpart 5 as written is that many business
establishments which are large enough to justify requiring that
they subscribe to a commercial background music service
(which music service would pay for the privilege of performing
copyrighted works) may very well be able to obtain the exemp-
tion because of the language in subpart 5. Thus, a cursory re-
view of advertisements by stereo retailers readily reflects the
fact that receivers and amplifiers of a kind commonly used in
private homes are available with exceptionally high power out-
puts. These receivers or amplifiers could easily drive numerous
small loudspeakers placed throughout a relatively large busi-
ness establishment. Yet, the exemption would prevail.
SECONDARY TRANSMISSIONS AND COMPULSORY LICENSES
(CABLE TELEVISION), SECTION 111
Comprising several pages of the new law, section 111 pro-
vides for the compulsory licensing of secondary transmissions
of copyrighted works, as well as for limitations on when such
secondary transmission is permissible. One of the major de-
ficiencies of the section is its complexity. It cannot be denied
that it is wordy, convoluted, and not likely to be easily under-
stood by the ordinary reader. Compounding these difficulties is
the fact that the essential determinations required by section
111 as to the scope of the exemption and the circumstances
charge is made, is exempt. If this exemption is stretched too far it would have
the effect of nullifying the limitations imposed by § 110(5) on Buck or Aiken
type secondary transmissions. Both the HOUSE REPORT and the CONFERENCE
REPORT, as quoted above, reflect Congress' intention that § 110(5) have a mean-
ingful effect. Neither Buck nor Aiken are mentioned in either the HOUSE
-REPORT or the CONFERENCE REPORT discussions of § 111. The two sections can be
read consistent with each other only so long as each is strictly limited to its own
terms. Thus, § 111 can only allow secondary transmissions into private lodging
rooms or areas. HOUSE REPORT at 91. Any secondary transmission as was done
in Buck into public areas (i.e., dining areas, hallways or lobbies) would be an
infringement under § l10(5)(B) which would not be saved by § 1l1(a)(1). If the
phrase "private lodgings" in § 1ll(a)(1) is read expansively it would have the
effect of nullifying § 110(5)(B). "Private lodgings" in § 11 l(a)(1) must, therefore,
as the section itself and the HOUSE REPORT suggests, be read to refer to those
rooms or areas used as living quarters. Any secondary transmission into any
other area of the establishment would be an infringement that would not be
exempt under § 110(5)(B). Buck is thus legislatively overruled only to the extent
Buck disallows secondary transmissions into the private lodgings of the guests
or residents. Buck is still valid as to secondary transmissions into all other areas
of a business establishment.
under which compulsory licensing is required are to be made by
reference to "the rules, regulations, and authorizations of the
Federal Communications Commission. '64 From the copyright
owner's viewpoint the best legislation would of course be a
single statement that any secondary transmission constitutes an
infringement of copyright. Unfortunately for copyright owners,
the United States Supreme Court in Fortknightly Corp. v.
United Artists Television, Inc.65 and subsequently in Tele-
prompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.66 ruled
that, at least under the old law, the secondary transmission
would not constitute a performance of the copyrighted work
constituting an infringement. Congress, in enacting the new
law, was thus faced with a conflict of special interest groups,
and section 111 is its response.
The heart of section 111 is its compulsory license feature for
secondary transmissions by cable systems. These cable systems
may be for transmission of either television or radio programs,
or both. The major deficiency of the compulsory license system
is that the amount of the license fee is dependent solely upon the
gross receipts paid by subscribers to the cable system. To the
extent that a cable system is able to obtain additional revenues
from any other sources that revenue is not included when the
fee is computed. No reason is given in the House Report in its
discussion concerning copyright royalty payments under the
compulsory license for secondary transmissions why only gross
subscriber revenue was to be the determining factor in setting
the license fee.
67
Section11 l(f) defines various terms used throughout that sec-
tion including "primary transmission," "secondary transmis-
sion," "cable system," "local service area of a primary transmit-
ter" and "distant signal equivalent." Unfortunately, as set forth
above, some of these definitions themselves are defined by re-
ference to the rules, regulations and authorizations of the Fed-
eral Communications Commission.68 A further complication is
that as to some definitions the rules, regulations or authoriza-
tions of the Federal Communications Commission referred to
are those in effect on April 15, 1976; whereas, in other circumst-
ances they are apparently those in effect on the date that any
64. See, e.g., §§ 111(b), 111(c), and 111(f). At the very least, Section 111
requires copyright owners and copyright users to subscribe to or be readily
familiar with the Code of Federal Regulations and the Federal Register.
65. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
66. 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
67. HOUSE REPORT, note 9, supra at 96-97.
68. See, note 50, supra.
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claim is made that section 111 has been violated. 69 Had the
reference in all cases been solely to the rules, regulations or
authorizations in effect on April 15, 1976, the Register of
Copyright by regulation or announcement could have provided
in routine fashion to copyright owners and users in readily
usable form the information contained in those rules, regula-
tions and authorizations. °
LIMITATIONS ON COPYRIGHT IN PICTORIAL, GRAPHIC AND
SCULPTURAL WORKS-USEFUL ARTICLES, SECTION 113
Section 113(a) allows the owner of a copyright to pictorial,
graphic or sculptural work (as described in section 106) to re-
produce that work "in or on any kind of article, whether useful
or otherwise." That right is limited in two respects.
Copyright under section 113 will not prevent the making,
distribution or display of pictures or photographs of copy-
righted works, reproduced in useful articles which have been
offered for sale or otherwise distributed to the public, when the
pictures or photographs are used in advertisements concerning
the distribution of the useful article or news reports concerning
the useful article.71 The House Report offers no helpful com-
69. Compare the definition for "secondary transmission" which is depen-
dent upon the rules, regulations or authorizations of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission, (apparently in effect at any future date) with the definition
for "local service area of a primary transmitter" which refers to the rules,
regulations and authorizations of the Federal Communications Commission in
effect on April 15, 1976.
70. As is made clear by the HOUSE REPORT at 99, the extent of the applicabil-
ity of Section 111 and the compulsory license provisions contained therein is
dependent not only upon the activities of the cable system but also upon the size
of the relevant market, both of which are themselves defined by other regula-
tions of the Federal Communications Commission.
The definition of 'local service area of a primary transmitter' estab-
lishes the difference between 'local' and 'distant' signals and therefore
the line between signals which are subject to payment under the com-
pulsory license and those that are not. It provides that the local service
area of a television broadcast station is the area in which the station is
entitled to insist upon its signal being retransmitted by a cable system
pursuant to FCC rules and regulations. Under FCC rules and regula-
tions this so-called 'must carry' area is defined based upon the market
size and position of cable systems in 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.57, 76.59, 76.61 and
76.63. HOUSE REPORT, Note 9, supra at 99.
It is thus readily apparent that litigation with respect to whether or not the
compulsory license provisions are applicable will be an extremely expensive
endeavor. Even under the old law, which lacked the complexities of the new one,
cable television cases, as reflected by the size of the parties, were costly and
beyond the reach of the ordinary copyright owner.
71. 17 U.S.C. § 113(c) (new law).
mentary as to the purpose that is to be served by this section. An
example of a use that would probably fall within section 113(c),
and thus be protected from a. claim of infringement, would be
an advertisement for a woman's dress where the dress was
made of fabric printed with a copyrighted design. Any such use
of the copyrighted design imprinted upon the fabric would liter-
ally fall within section 106, and would not, therefore, be an
allowed use under section 109.72 However, in order to ensure
that the publication of such picture or photograph does not
mislead, it would seem-a worthwhile addition to the section to
require that when such picture or photograph of the article is
published that it be accompanied by a notice that the work
incorporated or reproduced in the useful article is subject to
copyright.
Section 113(b) of the new law makes no change in the old law.
In fact, it states that under the new law the owner of copyright
"in a work that portrays a useful article as such," is not afforded
any greater or lesser rights with respect to the making, distribution, or
display of the useful article so portrayed than those afforded to such
works under the law, whether title 17 or the common law or statutes of
a State, in effect on December 31, 1977, as held applicable and con-
strued by a court in an action brought under this title.7
3
According to the House Report, the rights granted the
copyright owner with respect to such useful articles are to be
determined on a case by case basis as in the past. Therefore, as
with definitions of pictorial, graphic and sculptural works and
useful articles, as discussed above, the beginning point must
always be Mazer v. Stein.7
4
The House Report asks the question "[t]o take the example
usually cited, would copyright in a drawing or a model of an
automobile give the artist the exclusive right to make auto-
mobiles of the same design?" 75 .The House Report does not an-
swer the question but seems to suggest that the answer should
be in the negative:
The 1961 Report of the Register of Copyrights stated, on the basis of
judicial precedent, that 'copyright in a pictorial, graphic or sculptural
work, portraying a useful article as such, does not extend to the manu-
facture of the useful article itself,' and recommends specifically that
'the distinctions drawn in this area by existing court decisions' not be
altered by the statute.76
72. Section 109 of the new law provides that an owner of a copy or
phonorecord of a work which is lawfully made and owned may sell or otherwise
dispose of the copy or phonorecord and in certain cases may display that copy
publicly without violating the copyright owner's copyright.
73. HOUSE REPORT, note 9, supra at 105.
74. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
75. HouSE REPORT, note 9, supra at 105.
76. Id.
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in fact, however, the logic of the court's decision in Esquire,
Inc. v. Ringer77 would seem to compel an affirmative answer. In
Esquire, as noted above, the court ruled that an obviously
utilitarian, but nonetheless decorative outdoor lighting fixture
would be subject to copyright protection. If the fixture itself
was subject to copyright protection, then, a fortiori, a drawing
of that fixture, whether made before or after the manufacture
of the fixture, would itself be subject to copyright protection as
a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work. If both a drawing of the
fixture and the fixture itself are subject to copyright, then one is
easily a derivative work of the other under the definition of
derivative work as found in section 101. Under section 106(2)
the copyright owner has the right to prepare derivative works
based upon his own copyrighted works. The net result is that,
notwithstanding the limitations which the Register of
Copyrights seeks to impose, or those which the House Report
suggests exists, if the useful article contains any element which
can be considered artistic it is not for the Register of Copyright
to attempt to measure that artistic component. 78 Hence, if a
copyrighted work portrays a useful article, which useful article
is in any way "artistic," the copyright owner will indeed have
the right to produce or to prevent others from producing that
useful article.
This result is not astounding; nor is it unduly disruptive of
commerce. Copyright does not now, nor will it under the new
law, prevent others from using the same basic idea to express
themselves individually. Copyright extends only to the expres-
sion, and not the idea.79 Thus, the mere fact that a copyright
owner has expressed in a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work
an original design of a useful article does not mean that no other
craftsman or artist may himself create an original design of a
similar useful article. Others are simply prevented from copy-
ing. Further, to the extent any such design is made by an em-
ployee, the owner of copyright will be the employer.80 Hence, if
an employee of General Motors produces, as a part of his em-
ployment, a drawing or model of an automobile, General Motors
77. 414 F. Supp. 939 (D.D.C. 1976).
78. Id. at 941.
79. See, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (new law); and HouSE REPORT, note 9, supra at 57.
80. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (new law). See also the definition of "work made for
hire" in § 101 of the new law 17 U.S.C. § 101. Works by an employee within the
will own the copyright in that drawing or model. General
Motors then has the right to produce automobiles from that
design, and also -has the right to prevent others from doing so.
Finally, as copyright only protects that which is original as to
the author, the right of a copyright owner to prevent others
from producing useful articles of a similar design will only
extend to those portions of the useful article which meet that
requirement of originality. 81 If a copyright owner's expression
of the useful article is similar to numerous other public domain
expressions of the same or similar articles, the alleged infringer
will likely be able to show that his expression was derived from
those public domain works.
SOUND RECORDINGS AND COMPULSORY LICENSES
FOR MAKING AND DISTRIBUTING PHONORECORDS,
SECTIONS 114 AND 115
Section 114 retains protection provided under the old law for
sound recordings. As that term is defined by section 101 of the
new law, the person who fixes a series of musical, spoken or
other sounds (but ... not including sounds which accompany
audiovisual works) has created works known as sound record-
ings regardless of the nature of the material objects, whether
they be disks, tapes or any other type of phonorecord, in which
those sounds are embodied. The copyright owner of sound re-
cordings has the right to prevent others from making duplicates
of those sounds under section 114(a) and (b). Section 114 thus
extends protection only to the exact sounds as fixed on a
phonorecord, prohibiting their exact reproduction. Section 114
does not prohibit others from independently recreating and re-
cording those sounds even though such recreation is a virtual
imitation of the sounds fixed in the sound recording.
Nonetheless, should an imitation of the sounds fixed in the
scope of his or her employment are automatically works made for hire. As to
works specially ordered or commissioned, § 101 provides that they will be works
made for hire only if there is an agreement in writing which specifically so
provides, and the work is to be used as a contribution to a collective work, as a
part of a motion picture or other audio visual work, as a translation, as a
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as
answer material for a test or as an atlas. The implication of the section, and the
explanatory language of the HousE REPORT at page 121, is that as to all other
classes of work they cannot be considered works made for hire, even by agree-
ment. As to these latter works, the person specially ordering or commissioning
them could become the copyright owner only by a transfer from the author.
81. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); and HousE REPORT, note 9, supra at 51 and 57.
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sound recording be made, the person so making that imitation
will have to comply with the compulsory license provisions of
section 115 when the sounds fixed in the sound recording are
non-dramatic musical works. Under section 115 as presently
available under sections l(e) and 101(e) of the old law, the right
to reproduce a phonorecord of a copyrighted work is only avail-
able when the work is a non-dramatic musical work. A
copyright user thus may not rely upon the provisions of the
compulsory license provided by section 115 to make a
phonorecord of a dramatic musical work or of a dramatic or
non-dramatic literary work, or any other non-dramatic musical
work. As to such categories of works, the making of a
phonorecord will require the express approval of the copyright
owner of the underlying work, or it will constitute an
infringement. 2
Sections 114 and 115 will not affect statutes such as that in-
volved in Goldstein v. California3 with respect to the pirating
of musical compositions fixed prior to February 15, 1972. A
sound recording fixed before that date would not have been
subject to copyright protection under the old law,84 and it does
not acquire copyright protection under the new law. The Gold-
stein court concluded that California could, under state law,
properly prevent the duplication of such sounds by a penal
statute.8 Further, the Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
have ruled that a record pirate cannot, by simply paying the
compulsory license fees, obtain the right to pirate such record-
ings under the' compulsory license sections of the old law.86
Section 114 and section 115 of the new law retain this rule.
Section 301(c) preserves the vitality of the Goldstein decision
and continues to allow state law to protect sound recordings
fixed prior to February 15, 1972, at least until February 15, 2047.
82. See, 17 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 106(1) which gives the copyright owner the
exclusive right to make phonorecords of the work (subject to §§ 107-118).
83. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
84. Id. at 552; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 653k.
85. 412 U.S. at 570-71.
86. Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 506 F.2d 392
(3d Cir. 1974, as amended 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975), Fame Publish-
ing Co. v. Alabama Custom Tape, Inc., 507 F.2d 667 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 841 (1975), Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 847 (1972), and Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado
Magnetics, Inc., 497 F.2d 285, aff'd on rehearing en banc, 497 F.2d 292 (10th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975).
COIN-OPERATED PHONORECORD PLAYERS, SECTION 116
One of the most anomolous provisions contained in the old
law was the so-called jukebox exemption of section 1(e). As
chronicled in the House Report, numerous efforts had been
made to remove that exemption, but none were successful prior
to the enactment of the new law. 87 While copyright owners of
works performed in coin-operated phonorecord players
(jukeboxes) would undoubtedly have preferred no exemption
whatsoever; the new law, with its requirement for the payment
of an $8.00 yearly fee for each phonorecord player, should be
welcomed. The biggest problem to be encountered under this
exemption will undoubtedly be with respect to the distribution
of the proportionate share of the proceeds of the fee to all
copyright owners of works used in such devices. As section
116(c) contains an exemption from the antitrust laws to allow
copyright owners to deal through performing rights societies
(such as ASCAP, BMI and SESAC),-these societies will undoub-
tedly act to substantially ease the burden for the copyright
owner.
CONCLUSION
The above discussion demonstrates that the new law is defi-
cient or uncertain in several respects. The new law is, without
doubt, cumbersome, complex and corpulent. It is as though the
drafters of the new law, having decided that we now live in a
more complex society, concluded that a more complicated law
is needed to deal with that complexity. In an area such as
copyright, with every citizen of this nation a potential copyright
owner, a simpler law would surely have been preferred. To the
extent that the new law contains conflicts, inconsistencies and
ambiguities as to the protection afforded copyright owners and
the rights given copyright users, interpretation by Congress or
the courts is necessary. When such interpretation occurs, the
Constitutional preseciption of article I, section 8, clause 8, to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right of
their respective Writings and Discoveries" should be kept in
mind. All of these conflicts, inconsistencies and ambiguities
should be resolved in favor of the copyright owner. The new law
was over ten years in the making and was indeed an ambitious
project. It is unfortunate, that after so many years, and so much
effort, problems and uncertainties such as those discussed in
87. HOUSE REPORT, note 9, supra at 111-113.
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this article still remain for case by case determination.8 8 The
new law may survive and prove quite successful. Its chance of
success would seem to be increased if its drafters would heed
the doctor's typical warning to lose some weight and tighten up
the flabby muscles.
88. It is noteworthy that even the Register of Copyrights, Barbara Ringer,
who has pressed for the passage of the new law has expressed some grave
doubts about its effect on American authors.
A final observation is in order. Imperfect and antiquated as they all
have been, our copyright laws up to now have been based on the harsh
but free system of enterprise that grew up in England and America.
Under this system authors are free to write and live by writing if they
can manage to command the attention of a large enough segment of the
populace to make the dissemination of their works even marginally
profitable.
It is hard to predict what the effect of the revised copyright law of the
United States will have on this system. The revision bill, in important
respects, seems to have adopted a posture of hostility to the concept of
the free market. In certain areas, the new law would intrude the gov-
ernment into the process of establishing the 'value' of certain uses of
copyrighted works. If the various compulsory licenses and Royalty
Tribunals or Commissions are allowed to establish precedents for the
general conditions and terms of authorship, we will be running the risk
of losing something that took two centuries of development to create.
That is, a real market place in ideas and art, an irredeemably precious
component of our individualism, still existing miraculously in an age
increasingly uncomfortable in the company of individualists B. Ringer,
Two Hundred Years of American Copyright Law, 200 YEARS OF ENG-
LISH AND AMERICAN PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW 130
(Am. Bar Ass'n, 1976).
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